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Due to the preponderance of single mothers on public assistance, delinquent child support has 
been a contentious political issue in the U.S. for over 30 years. We examine whether joint-child-
custody reform affects the child-support receipt of single mothers. We use variation in the timing 
of joint-custody reforms across states to identify the effect of joint custody on the child-support 
receipt of single mothers. Joint-custody enactment raises the probability of receiving child 
support for all single mothers by six percent. However, the effect on all single mothers is driven 
by the effect on divorced mothers since separated and never-married mothers are unaffected by 
joint-custody reform. We conclude joint-custody reform confers the most benefit on divorced 
mothers and their children, particularly those who do not receive public assistance.     
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1. Introduction 
Lack of financial support from noncustodial fathers places an enormous burden on single 
mothers in the United States.  Since the 1970s, state and federal governments have passed a bevy 
of child-support-enforcement (CSE) legislation in order to minimize single mothers’ dependence 
on public assistance (Beller and Graham 1993).  During this time, many states also passed 
legislation directing courts to consider shared child custody as the preferred custodial 
arrangement (Brinig and Buckley 1998).  Although public policy has been overwhelmingly 
focused on obtaining and subsequently enforcing child-support orders for single mothers, joint 
child custody may provide additional incentive for fathers to pay child support because they are 
able to both spend more time with their children and monitor how child-support payments are 
spent (Brinig and Buckley 1998).  In fact for parents with child-support awards, 84.6 percent  of 
those with joint-custody arrangements receive some child support.
1
  By contrast, the child-
support receipt rate is 61.5 percent for those with a sole-custody arrangement.
2
   
Several studies suggest joint-child-custody arrangements increase the receipt and level of 
child-support income (Pearson and Thoennes 1988; Del Boca and Ribero 1998; Huang et al. 
2003), while others suggest joint-child-custody arrangements have no effect on the receipt and 
level of child-support income (Seltzer 1991; 1998; Arditti and Keith 1993; Gunnoe and Braver 
2001; Seltzer and Maralani 2001).  The inconsistencies present in the existing literature are likely 
the result of differences in socioeconomic status (SES), a reflection of the parents’ education, 
financial resources, and subsequent level of access to the legal system (Seltzer 1991), and 
unobserved characteristics of the family that determine continued (or lack of) support from 
                                               
1 Statistics referenced from the U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement.  Data used to generate the report come 
from the April 2006 Current Population Survey Child Support Supplement 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60-234.pdf   
2 Ibid. 
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fathers following dissolution.  Because of these issues, it is difficult to estimate the causal effect 
of joint child custody on the child-support receipt of single mothers.   
A way to circumvent these issues is to use varation in the timing of joint-child-custody 
reforms across states, which proxy for the prevalence of joint-custody arrangements, as a natural 
experiment to identify the average treatment effect (ATE) of the policy change, which provides a 
causal interpretation (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  Natural experiments require treatment and 
comparison groups.  The treatment group in this study is single mothers who live in states that 
adopt joint-custody laws between 1978 and 1993.  The comparison group is single mothers who 
live in states that had yet to adopt joint-custody laws by the last survey date.   
We also provide two other important extensions to the existing literature.  First, we estimate 
the effects of joint-custody reform on the probability of receiving child support separately for 
never-married, divorced, and separated mothers.  Second, we estimate the effects of joint-
custody reform on the probability of receiving child support for sub-samples of single mothers 
who receive public assistance and for those who do not receive public assistance.  Examining 
these subsamples of single mothers likely provides a clearer picture of how joint custody affects 
child-support receipt, as these mothers have different rates of receiving both joint-child-custody 
arrangements and child-support income.  
Data on child-support receipt are from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1978 
to 1993.  We use a logit specification to estimate the effects of joint-custody reform on the 
probability of receiving child support for all single mothers, for sub-samples of never-married, 
divorced, and separated mothers, and for sub-samples of single mothers who receive public 
assistance and for those who do not receive public assistance.  We find a statistically significant, 
positive effect of joint-custody reform on the probability of receiving child support for all single 
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mothers, which translates into a seven percent increase.  However, the effect on all single 
mothers may be driven by the effect on divorced mothers, whose probability of receiving child 
support increases by eight percent when examined separately.  We find no statistical evidence 
linking joint-custody reform to the probability of receiving child-support income for never-
married and separated mothers.   
The effects of joint-custody reform differ for the partitioned samples based on receipt of 
public assistance.  For single mothers who do not receive public assistance, joint-custody reform 
raises the probability of receiving child support by eight percent.  However, divorced mothers 
benefit the most, as the probability of receiving child support increases by six percent following 
joint-custody reform.  Never-married and separated mothers who do not receive public assistance 
are unaffected by the joint-custody reform.  For the sample of single mothers who receive public 
assistance, joint-custody reform has no effect on the probability of receiving child support.  This 
finding is robust for sub-samples of never-married, divorced, and separated mothers.  We 
conclude joint-custody reform confers the most benefit on divorced mothers, particularly those 
who do not receive public assistance.    
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
information on child-custody reform, theoretical predictions of how we expect joint-custody 
reform to affect the child-support receipt of single mothers, and previous research on the effect 
of joint custody (including actual custodial allocations and state-level reforms) on the child-
support receipt of single mothers. Section 3 discusses the data and econometric methodology. 
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2.  Background 
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2.1. Child-Custody Legislation 
From the 1920s until the 1960s, states had explicit provisions stating their preference for mothers 
in child-custody cases (Kelly 1994).  By the mid-1970s, the majority of states removed the 
explicit preference for mothers when allocating custody rights (Cancian and Meyer 1998).  With 
the passage of the federal Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act in 1970, gender-neutral, child-
custody laws became the standard by which courts measured the best interests of the child 
(BIOC).
3
 Despite this legal change, courts continued to award sole custody to mothers in the 
majority of cases (Cancian and Meyer 1998).  However, in the 1970s and 1980s, many states 
either developed explicit provisions or set precedent by ruling in favor of joint-child-custody 
arrangements (Kelly 1994; Brinig and Buckley 1998).  Table 1 shows the timing of joint-custody 
reforms across states.
4
 
A number of underlying factors contributed to the widespread adoption of joint-custody laws 
across states.  First, the division of labor between parents began to change.  Fathers began 
participating in child rearing and other household activities at greater rates, while mothers’ 
participation in the labor market rose substantially (Jacob 1988).  The redefinition of traditional 
gender roles provided a political voice to fathers’ rights groups who actively sought equality in 
the division of children following marital dissolution (Jacob 1988).  Second, results from child-
development research indicated the importance of fathers in the development of children (Kelly 
1994).  Third, rising welfare participation among single mothers and the preponderance of 
―dead-beat‖ dads who were in arrears of child-support payments led states to consider policies 
aimed at resolving problems associated with the rising number of single-headed households.
5
   
                                               
3 See Kelly (1994) and Buehler and Gerard (1995) for a discussion of the BIOC standard.    
4 State joint-custody laws encompass both joint-physical and joint-legal custody.  
5
 As a legislative response to increasing welfare payments under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
attributable to delinquent child-support payments, the U.S. Congress created the CSE program in 1975. See Lerman 
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2.2. Theoretical Predictions of Joint-Custody Reform  
Fathers may be more likely to pay child support with joint-custodial arrangements because they 
spend more time with the child and are able to better monitor the allocation of child-support 
payments.
6
  Thus, we expect joint-custody reform to increase the child-support receipt of single 
mothers.  We also expect the effects of joint-custody reform to vary for never-married, divorced, 
and separated mothers for three reasons: (i) establishing paternity is an obstacle for never-
married mothers to obtain child-support orders but less so for divorced and separated mothers 
(Beller and Graham 1993), (ii) never-married fathers may have less of a bond with their children 
compared to separated and divorced fathers, and (iii) joint-custody arrangements are less 
common for never-married mothers relative to divorced and separated mothers (Seltzer 1998).  
As such, we expect joint-custody reform to have a smaller effect on the child-support receipt of 
never-married mothers.  By contrast, we expect joint-custody reform to increase the probability 
of receiving child support for divorced mothers. We also expect potential differences to arise 
between divorced and separated mothers for two reasons: (i) separated mothers may not have 
court settled arrangements for child custody or child support due to the uncertainty of future 
divorce and (ii) a portion of separated mothers may not divorce because of the high costs.
7
   
                                                                                                                                                       
(1993) and Sorensen Hill (2004) for more discussion on the CSE program and its many reforms.  The CSE program 
was implemented in states during the same time period as joint-custody reform. As a result, we control for CSE 
reforms and expenditures across states. Chien-Chung Huang provided the timing of these reforms across states, 
which were used in Huang (2002). 
6 For example, Garasky and Stewart (2007) find that increased visitation by non-resident fathers decreases the 
probability that children experience food insecurity. 
7 Separated mothers that remained married because of the high cost of divorce are likely to be of lower SES. In fact, 
39 percent of the separated mothers in our sample have less than a high school degree, compared to 41 percent of 
never-married mothers and only 23 percent of divorced mothers. Seltzer (1991) finds joint custody and child support 
are both positively related to SES. Thus, we expect the child-support receipt of separated mothers to be less affected 
by joint-custody reform.   
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The effects of joint-custody reform should also differ by the welfare-participation status of 
single mothers for two primary reasons.  First, single mothers who receive public assistance are 
less likely to have shared child custody, an indication that they may be unaffected by joint-
custody reform.  By contrast, single mothers who do not receive public assistance are more likely 
to have joint custody (Seltzer 1991).  Second, it is also plausible that fathers of the children 
whose mothers receive public assistance are of lower SES and unable to pay child support (Roff 
2008).  Third, mothers who receive public assistance have to relinquish their child-support 
receipts to the welfare agency. This may decrease fathers’ incentives to pay child support and 
mothers’ incentives to seek child support awards (Roff 2008).  As a result, we expect joint-
custody reform to have a smaller effect on single mothers who receive public assistance relative 
to those who do not receive public assistance. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the child-support receipt of single mothers. The 
statistics show that divorced mothers have the highest child-support-receipt rates.  Separated 
mothers have lower child-support-receipt rates, but never-married mothers have the lowest rates 
of child-support receipt. Partitioning the sample by welfare participation status, 18 percent of 
single mothers who receive public assistance receive child support compared to 48 percent of 
single mothers who do not receive public assistance. As was the case for nonpartitioned sample, 
divorced mothers have the highest child-support-receipt rates followed by separated and never-
married mothers, regardless of welfare-participation status.  However, the child-support-receipt 
rates are higher for those who do not receive public assistance relative to those that do receive 
public assistance.  
 
2.3. The Effects of Joint Child Custody on Child Support  
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A number of studies examine the relationship between joint-child-custody arrangements and 
child-support outcomes.
8
  Several of these find that the receipt and level of child-support income 
and joint custody are positively related (Pearson and Thoennes 1988; Del Boca and Ribero 1998; 
Huang et al. 2003), while others fail to detect a statistically significant link between the two 
variables (Seltzer 1991; 1998; Arditti and Keith 1993; Gunnoe and Braver 2001; Seltzer and 
Maralani 2001).  Individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity bias, the lack of 
nationally-representative data, and difficulty finding a valid instrument are all common problems 
when researchers attempt to establish a causal link between joint custody and child-support 
receipt.  
Researchers primarily use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to identify the causal 
effect of joint custody on child-support receipt.  In order for an instrument to be valid, it must be 
significantly correlated with joint custody but not otherwise affect child-support receipt (Staiger 
and Stock 1997).  Seltzer (1998) uses variation in child-custody laws across states; however a 
potential problem with this paper is that the sample postdates the majority of joint-custody 
reforms (See Table 1).
9
  As such, there remains little variation across states, which reduces the 
statistical power of joint-custody reforms to predict joint custody.  We believe the approach by 
Huang, Han, and Garfinkel (2003) is the most reliable.  They use biennial data from 1992-1998 
March and April CPSs.  Their instrument for the custodial arrangement is the percentage of joint-
                                               
8 A number of other studies examine the impact of various CSE reforms on the child-support receipt of single 
mothers. See, for example, Beller and Graham (1993), Argys and Peters (2001), Argys et al. (2001), Freeman and 
Waldfogel (2001), Sorensen and Hill (2004), and Neelakantan (forthcoming).   
9 Seltzer (1998) uses data from the National Survey of Families and Household (NSFH) for two waves: 1987-1988 
and 1992-1994.  The majority of states adopted joint custody in early- to mid-1980s.  In fact, 34 states adopted joint-
custody laws before 1987.  
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custody arrangements across states.  This instrument predicts joint custody but is statistically 
unrelated to child-support receipt, indicating it is a valid instrument statistically.
10
   
An alternative approach to identifying the causal effect of joint custody on child-support 
receipt is to use the timing of joint-custody reforms across states, as used by Brinig and Buckley 
(1998).   They use state-level, panel data and the timing of the joint-custody reforms across states 
to achieve identification.  Their results indicate a statistically significant, positive effect of joint-
custody laws on child-support receipt relative to child-support mandates.  Unfortunately, their 
sample begins in 1986 and ends in 1994, which postdates the majority of child-custody reforms 
across states (See Table 1).  In particular, from 1986 to 1994, 13 states adopt joint custody, while 
31 states adopt joint custody prior to 1986.  As such, their sample period does not encompass the 
majority of the variation in joint-custody reforms across states.  Another potential limitation is 
unobserved heterogeneity at the state level, which could bias estimates.  
Our study encompasses the work of previous research and provides a number of extensions.  
Similar to Brinig and Buckley (1998), we use the timing of joint-custody reforms across states as 
a source of quasi-experimental data with which to examine the impact of joint-custody 
arrangements on the receipt of child support.  Instead of using state-level panel data, we estimate 
the effects of joint-custody reform on a nationally-representative sample of single mothers, 
which allows us to differentiate between never-married, separated, and divorced mothers and 
single mothers who do and do not receive public assistance. Joint-custody reform is likely to 
affect these single mothers differently, as each receives joint-custody arrangements and child-
support income at different rates.   
                                               
10 Similar to Huang et al. (2003), Seltzer and Maralani (2001) use the percentage of child-custody cases as an 
instrument for joint custody.  A limiting factor of their study, however, is that it is only representative for Wisconsin.   
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We contend that using variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states to 
identify the causal effect of joint custody on child-support receipt is a better approach than IV 
because of the many problems associated with the IV approach (Nelson and Startz 1990a; 1990b; 
Bound et al. 1995; Staiger and Stock 1997).  The natural experiment approach we take is 
generally thought to protect against endogeneity associated with the policy variable; in the case 
of joint custody, selection bias is a major concern.  It is likely that family-level unobserved 
heterogeneity affects child-support receipt and is also correlated with whether or not the post-
dissolution family has a joint-custody arrangement.  Hence, we believe the differences-in-
differences (DD) approach generates a ―cleaner‖ estimate of the effect of joint custody on child-
support receipt because it allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity through the 
separation of families into ―treatment‖ and ―comparison‖ groups.  However, there are well 
known problems associated with the DD estimator, most notably that the standard error 
associated with the policy estimate is often understated (Bertrand et al. 2004).  To address this 
potential problem, we cluster standard errors at the state-time level.
11
   
Our analysis extends the existing literature in the following ways.  First, we are able to 
identify the causal effect of joint-child-custody arrangements on the child-support receipt of 
single mothers by using the variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms across states as 
quasi-experimental data. Second, the sample spans from 1978 to 1993, over which time 42 states 
adopt joint custody.  This provides additional variation to identify the causal effect of joint-
custody arrangements on the child-support receipt of single mothers than found in the 
literature.
12
 Using the DD approach allows us to interpret our estimated effect of joint-custody 
                                               
11 See Bertrand et al. (2004) and Angrist and Pischke (2009) for more information on adjusting standard errors for 
the DD estimator.  
12 It is unlikely that the joint-custody and CSE reforms are independent of one another, as both were part of the same 
legislative agenda to address problems associated with the rising incidence of single-parent households (Jacob, 
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reform as a causal effect (Angrist and Pischke 2009).  Third, we estimate the effects of joint-
custody reform on the receipt of child support for sub-samples of never-married, divorced, and 
separated mothers.  Fourth, we estimate separately the effects of joint-custody reform on the 
child-support receipt of single mothers who do not receive public assistance and for those who 
receive public assistance.   
 
3. Data and Econometric Strategy 
We use data from the March CPS from 1978 to 1993 to examine the impact of joint-custody 
reform on the child-support receipt of single mothers.  A number of other researchers use the 
April CPS-Child Support Supplement (CSS) (Beller and Graham 1993; Huang et al. 2003).  An 
advantage of using the April CPS-CSS is the availability of information on child-support awards 
and custodial allocation.
13
  Despite this advantage, the April CPS-CSS has several critical 
drawbacks: it is biennial and information on the child-support income of single mothers is 
collected for fewer years than the March CPS.  The March CPS has its advantages over the April 
CPS: annual surveys are provided and information on child-support income is reported in each 
survey year.  The most important reason to use the March CPS is the annual frequency of 
surveying.  Because child-custody reforms occur in almost every year, this provides a way to 
exploit fully the variation in the timing of these legal changes.  Using biennial data, as provided 
by the April CPS-CSS, does not fully exploit the variation in the timing of joint-custody reforms. 
In particular, using the April CPS-CSS assumes that between-survey-year law changes affect 
                                                                                                                                                       
1988). We are able to control for these law changes by estimating the effects of joint-custody during the time period 
when both joint-custody and CSE reforms were changing. 
13 From 1992 onwards, the April CPS-CSS also collects data on custodial allocations, including whether there is a 
joint-custody arrangement. However, this information is only available for years that postdate the majority of legal 
reforms directing courts to consider joint custody as the preferred custodial allocation. 
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child-support receipt the same as law changes occurring in the survey year.
14
  This could lead to 
a finding of a spurious relationship between joint-custody reform and child-support receipt.   
The one drawback of the March CPS is the lack of information provided on whether child-
support awards were granted by courts.  This is a potential source of bias.  If child-support 
awards are negatively correlated with joint-custody reform but positively related to child-support 
receipt, our estimates are understated.  A negative correlation between joint-custody reform and 
child-support awards could arise from cooperation among parents and/or informal child-support 
agreements. By contrast, if joint-custody reform is positively correlated with child-support 
awards and child-support awards are positively related to child-support receipt, our estimates are 
overstated.
15
  Due to data limitations, we are unable to test the correlation between joint-custody 
reform and child-support awards.  However, we are able to use the 1994 April CPS to examine 
the correlation between actual joint-custody arrangements and child-support awards.  The 
correlation coefficient between joint-custody arrangements and child-support due (not 
necessarily mandated by courts) is 0.20, while the correlation coefficient between joint-custody 
arrangements and child-support awards ordered by courts is -0.06.  Both of these correlation 
coefficients are small, indicating weak relationships between joint-custody arrangements and 
child-support awards.  
Female single-headed households with own children under 18 present are our units of 
observation.  Our full sample contains never-married, divorced, and separated mothers.  We 
eliminate observations that contain subfamilies and those in which the mother is not the head of 
                                               
14 Another limitation is that the survey begins in 1979, and the next year of survey occurs in 1982. This is important, 
as 13 states adopt joint-custody laws between 1979 and 1982.   
15 The March CPS does not have information on child-support awards; however, we are able to use the April CPS-
CSS to gain insight into the relationship between child-support awards and child-support receipt. During a sample 
period analogous to ours, 78 percent of single mothers with a child-support award receive some child support. Over 
this period, data is not available on the child-support receipt for mothers without awards. However, new variables 
collected in the 1994 April CPS-CSS show only nine percent of mothers without child-support awards receive any 
child support. 
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household.  We use this sample because the child-support-income variable is provided at the 
household level. Therefore, all persons living in the household are given the same value as the 
head of the household.
16
   
We use Brinig and Buckley’s (1998) child-custody law coding (See Table 1).  Both cross-
state and cross-time variation in child-custody reforms provide a source of quasi-experimental 
data with which to examine how the adoption of laws directing courts to consider joint-custody 
arrangements as the preferred custodial allocation alter the incentives of noncustodial fathers to 
pay child support.  Single mothers who live in states that adopt joint custody in any year between 
1978 and 1993 are the treatment group.  The comparison group is comprised of single mothers 
who live in states that had yet to adopt joint custody by the survey date.  In 1978, only three 
percent of our sample lives in joint-custody states.  However, by 1993, 93 percent of the sample 
lives in states that have adopted joint custody at some point during the sample period.  Hence, 
our treatment and comparison groups exhibit substantial variation over time.   
Our econometric strategy is to compare the child-support receipt of single mothers who live 
in states that enact joint custody with those who live in states that have yet to enact joint custody.  
The main covariate of interest is joint-custody reform.  The econometric model is 
.,,,4,,3
,210,,
s t tsittsststsi
tsts,tsi
u
CustodyJointSupportChild
SX
CSE
 (1) 
The terms i, s, and t represent single mothers, states, and time, respectively.  The variable Child 
Support equals one if the single mother receives child-support income and zero otherwise; Joint 
                                               
16 For example, consider a married couple with four children, all of which are female. Assume the parents have three 
girls above the age of 18 and one under the age of 18, and that the head of the household reports having one child 
under 18 and a zero for child-support income received. Since they are reported at the household level, everyone in 
the household gets a one for children under 18 and a zero for child-support receipt. The parents are not in our sample 
because they are married. However, the three daughters would each get an observation as a never-married mother 
with one child who receives no child support. Deleting sub-families circumvents this problem. 
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Custody equals one if a state adopts joint custody and zero otherwise; CSE is a vector of CSE 
variables, including expenditures and various reforms;
17
 X is vector of single mother controls, 
including age, race, educational attainment, the number of children under  six, and the number of 
children under 18; S is a vector of time-varying, state-level controls, including the 
contemporaneous and lagged maximum AFDC benefits paid to families of four and the 
unemployment rate along with two of its lags;
18
 η and  τ are state and time fixed effects, 
respectively; and u is the disturbance term.  Table 3 presents variable definitions and summary 
statistics for single-mother and state-level controls. 
Angrist and Pischke (2009) suggest that controls at the state level (i.e. CSE, S, and η) are the 
most important covariates to aid in parsing the effect of the policy variable from other influences. 
This natural experiment approach circumvents problems with unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual level but requires additional controls at the state level to ensure identification.  In 
particular, we contend that the variables in CSE are most important, as they were part of a 
parallel legislative agenda.  Hence, it is important to estimate the effect of joint-custody reform 
on the child-support receipt of single mothers holding the variables in CSE constant.  Failure to 
include these variables as controls could result in a spurious relationship between joint-custody 
reform and the child-support receipt of single mothers.  
 
4. Results 
                                               
17  We also estimate models with an additive index of the CSE reform variables as in Huang (2002) and Huang et al. 
(2003).  The CSE index is not statistically different from zero in any specification.  As such, we do not present the 
results of these models.  The inclusion of the additive CSE index does not materially affect the estimated effect of 
joint-custody reform.   
18 We also check the sensitivity of our estimates to the inclusion of additional state-level controls, including real per-
capita income, the demographic make-up of the population, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) participation rates, 
and other family-law reforms, and we find that the estimated effects of joint-custody reform are not materially 
affected by the inclusion of these variables.  As such, we do not report these results.  The chosen empirical 
specification is comparable to recent work by Sorensen and Hill (2004).  
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In Section 4.1, we examine the impact of joint-custody reform on the probability of receiving 
child support for all single mothers and for sub-samples of never-married, divorced, and 
separated mothers.  In Section 4.2, we estimate the impact of joint-custody reform on the 
probability of receiving child support for sub-samples of single mothers based on their welfare-
participation status.  Estimates for the single-mother and state-level controls are presented in 
Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix.  
 
4.1. Logit Estimates for Single Mothers  
Table 4 presents the estimated marginal effects of joint-custody reform on the child-support 
receipt of all single mothers and for sub-samples of never-married, divorced, and separated 
mothers.  In the model for all single mothers, we present different intercepts for divorced and 
separated mothers and for those who receive public assistance.  Likewise, the models estimated 
for subsamples of never-married, separated, and divorced mothers include a different intercept 
for those who receive public assistance.  The estimates for the indicator variables in models for 
all single mothers suggest that divorced and separated mothers are more likely to receive child 
support than their never-married counterparts.  By contrast, single mothers who receive public 
assistance are less likely to receive child support relative to those who do not receive public 
assistance, which is also the case for each of the subsamples of never-married, separated, and 
divorced mothers.   
The estimated effect for joint-custody reform corresponds to a seven percent (or 2.1 
percentage point) increase in the probability of receiving child support for all single mothers.
19
  
The estimates for the different sub-groups of single mothers show that only divorced mothers are 
                                               
19 We calculate the percent change in the probability of receiving child support by using the predicted values for the 
probability of receiving child support when the variable Joint-Custody Reform is set equal to zero and one, while all 
other right-hand-side variables are held at their mean values.  
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significantly affected by joint-custody reform.  Their probability of receiving child support 
increases by eight percent (or 3.6 percentage points) following joint-custody reform.  Because 
never-married and separated mothers are unaffected by child-custody reform, divorced mothers 
appear to be driving the results for the sample of all single mothers.   
Our findings are generally consistent with our initial hypotheses.  Joint-custody reform raises 
the probability of receiving child support for all single mothers. However, the child-support 
receipt of never-married and separated mothers is unaffected by joint-custody reform, while the 
probability of receiving child support rises for divorced mothers: the group of single mothers 
most likely to have shared child custody.  A likely reason for the lack of statistically significant 
finding for never-married mothers is that they are least likely to receive a joint-custody 
arrangement, primarily because they are often of low SES and establishing paternity is often 
difficult.  There are a number of reasons divorced mothers may be different from separated 
mothers with respect to joint-custody reform and child-support receipt.  Perhaps, the most likely 
reason for this difference is that child custody and child-support awards are unlikely to be settled 
for separated couples.  This could be due to the possibility that separated mothers are often of 
low SES, which may make divorce too costly to pursue. By contrast, divorced mothers are the 
most likely to receive a joint-custody arrangement, as they are more likely to be of higher SES.  
Our estimates for the effect of joint-custody reform on child-support receipt, while similar in 
sign, differ in magnitude from those found by Brinig and Buckley (1998).  They find a ten 
percentage point increase in child-support receipt relative to child-support orders.  We also find a 
statistically significant, positive effect of joint-custody reform on single mothers’ child-support 
receipt, but our estimate is much smaller.  Specifically, we find a 2.1 percentage point (or seven 
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percent) increase in the child-support receipt rates for all single mothers following joint-custody 
reform.   
We contend that our estimates differ from Brinig and Buckley (1998) for two primary 
reasons.
20
  First, our sample encompasses the dramatic shift from the maternal-preference to the 
joint-custody standard which began in the late-1970s and continued throughout the 1980s.  
Brinig and Buckley’s (1998) sample period begins in 1986, which postdates the majority of 
joint-custody reforms.  As a result, their estimates could reflect a pre-existing trend rather than 
the effect of joint-custody reform on child-support receipt, which could overstate the estimated 
effect.  In fact, Sorensen and Hill (2004, Figure 1) present trends in child-support receipt rates 
for single mothers, indicating an overall upward trend during the time in which the majority of 
child-custody reforms occurred (i.e. the early-1980s).  Wolfers (2006) shows that failure to 
account for pre-existing trends can drastically overstate the effects of state-level reforms on the 
outcome of interest.  Second, it could be that child-support-receipt rates and joint-custody reform 
are simultaneously determined.  The adoption of joint-custody laws may have been a low-cost 
(to the state) incentive for nonresidential parents to pay child support.  As such, low rates of 
child-support receipt could lead to joint-custody reform.  The use of household-level data 
circumvents this potential problem, as it is unlikely that individual child-support receipt caused 
state-level joint-custody reform.   
 
4.2. Logit Estimates for Single Mothers by Welfare-Participation Status  
                                               
20 Our results are similar to those of Huang et al. (2003) who find a positive effect of predicted joint custody on 
child-support payments to divorced mothers.  By contrast, our estimates do not support the conclusion by Seltzer 
(1998), who finds that joint custody is unrelated to child-support payments received by divorced mothers after 
conditioning on family characteristics.   
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The next set of models examines the impact of joint-custody reform on the child-support receipt 
of single mothers by welfare-participation status.  Table 5 presents the marginal effects of joint-
custody reform on the probability of receiving child support for all single mothers and for 
subsamples of never-married, separated, and divorced mothers who receive public assistance.  
We find no statistical evidence linking joint-custody reform to the child-support receipt of all 
single mothers who receive public assistance.  This effect is robust for subsamples of never-
married, divorced, and separated mothers. A couple of explanations exist for the lack of 
statistical significance found for the effect of joint-custody reform on the child-support receipt of 
single mothers who receive public assistance. First, single mothers who receive public assistance 
may either have to relinquish their child support to the welfare agency or receive lower welfare 
benefits. This reduces the incentive for noncustodial fathers to comply with child-support orders, 
and it also reduces the incentive for single mothers to pursue child-support income from 
nonresidential fathers (Roff 2008). Second, lower SES mothers are less likely to receive child 
support or joint custody.  Therefore, they should be less affected by joint-custody reform (Seltzer 
1991).  
Table 6 is analogous to Table 5, except that we focus on single mothers who do not receive 
public assistance.  It is clear from these estimates that single mothers who do not receive public 
assistance are affected differently by joint-custody reform than those who receive public 
assistance.  We find an eight percent (or 3.4 percentage point) increase in the probability of 
receiving child support for all single mothers after enactment of joint-custody laws.  Similar to 
the estimates shown in Table 3, joint-custody reform’s effect on divorced mothers appears to 
drive this result, as never-married and separated mothers are unaffected.  Divorced mothers’ 
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probability of receiving child support rises by six percent (or 3.4 percentage points) following 
joint-custody reform.   
The estimates shown for the effects of joint-custody reform on the child-support receipt for 
sub-samples of single mothers who receive public assistance and for those who do not receive 
public assistance largely support our hypotheses.  Consistent with our predictions, the probability 
of receiving child support for single mothers who do not receive public assistance increases 
following joint-custody reform, while the probability of receiving child support is unaffected for 
single mothers who receive public assistance.  Similar to the results from Section 4.1, the 
estimated effects on single mothers who do not receive public assistance appear to be driven by 
divorced mothers, as the child-support-receipt rates of never-married and separated mother are 
unaffected by joint-custody reform.   
 
5. Conclusions 
The preponderance of single mothers on public assistance is attributable primarily to lack of 
child-support payments from noncustodial fathers. Thus, increasing collection of delinquent 
child support has been a contentious political issue in the U.S. for over 30 years (Freeman and 
Waldfogel 2001; Sorensen and Hill 2004; Rowe 1989). Because joint-custody reform does not 
have explicit costs to taxpayers but provides incentives for fathers to pay child support, it could 
be a low-cost way for states to reduce the welfare dependency of single mothers.  We study the 
impact of joint-child-custody legislation on the child-support receipt of single mothers.  We 
exploit variation in the timing of child-custody reforms across states to identify the effect of 
joint-custody reform on the probability of receiving child support for single mothers.  Using data 
from the March CPS, we find a statistically significant, positive effect of joint-custody reform on 
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the probability of receiving child-support income for single mothers.  This effect translates into a 
seven percent (or two percentage point) increase in the probability of receiving child support.  
Our results indicate joint-custody reform provides a positive incentive for non-resident fathers to 
pay child support.   
Because never-married mothers are less likely to have joint-custody arrangements than 
divorced or separated mothers, we partition the data into subsamples of never-married, divorced, 
and separated mothers.  We find that never-married and separated mothers are unaffected by 
joint-custody reform.  By contrast, the probability that divorced mothers receive child support 
rises by approximately eight percent (or four percentage points) following joint-custody reform.  
This suggests that the effect of joint-custody reform on the child-support receipt of all single 
mothers is driven primarily by the effect on divorced mothers.      
We also consider the effects of joint-custody reform on the child-support receipt of 
subsamples of single mothers who receive public assistance and for those who do not receive 
public assistance.  These single mothers differ both in terms of child-support-receipt rates and 
the likelihood of having a joint-child-custody arrangement. Joint-custody reform increases the 
probability of receiving child support for single mothers who do not receive public assistance, 
while there is no statistical evidence that joint-custody reform affects the probability of receiving 
child support for those who receive public assistance.   
There is significant debate as to whether joint custody places the more vulnerable party—
mothers—in a worse bargaining position following divorce, and whether joint custody increases 
the involvement of non-resident parents in the lives of their children (Seltzer 1991; Jacob 1988).  
While our study does not necessarily shed light on these important issues, our overall conclusion 
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is that joint-custody reform does increase child-support receipt rates for those most likely to have 
joint-custody arrangements: divorced mothers who do not receive public assistance.   
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Table 1: Year of Introduction of Joint-Custody Laws by State 
State Joint Custody  State Joint Custody 
Alabama -- Montana 1981 
Alaska 1982 Nebraska 1983 
Arizona 1991 Nevada 1981 
Arkansas -- New Hampshire 1974 
California 1979 New Jersey 1981 
Colorado 1983 New Mexico 1982 
Connecticut 1981 New York 1981 
Delaware 1981 North Carolina 1979 
Florida 1979 North Dakota 1993 
Georgia 1990 Ohio 1981 
Hawaii 1980 Oklahoma 1990 
Idaho 1982 Oregon 1987 
Illinois 1986 Pennsylvania 1981 
Indiana 1973 Rhode Island 1992 
Iowa 1977 South Carolina -- 
Kansas 1979 South Dakota 1989 
Kentucky 1979 Tennessee 1986 
Louisiana 1981 Texas 1987 
Maine 1981 Utah 1988 
Maryland 1984 Vermont 1992 
Massachusetts 1983 Virginia 1987 
Michigan 1981 Washington -- 
Minnesota 1981 West Virginia -- 
Mississippi 1983 Wisconsin  1979 
Missouri 1983 Wyoming 1993 
Notes: Data for the child-custody reforms are from Brinig and Buckley (1998). -- indicates the state has not passed 
joint-custody laws.     
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Child-Support Receipt of Single Mothers  
Variable All  Never Married Divorced  Separated 
     
Full Sample     
     
Child-Support Receipt  
0.3651 
(0.4815) 
0.1444 
(0.3515) 
0.5165 
(0.4997) 
0.2822 
(0.4500) 
     
Number of Observations 51,274 13,251 25,756 12,267 
     
Partitioned Samples by Receipt of Public Assistance   
    
Receives Public Assistance    
     
Child-Support Receipt  
0.1818 
(0.3857) 
0.1271 
(0.3331) 
0.2678 
(0.4429) 
0.1569 
(0.3637) 
     
Number of Observations 19,322 7,864 6,366 5,102 
     
Does not Receive Public Assistance    
     
Child-Support Receipt  
0.4774 
(0.4995) 
0.1703 
(0.3758) 
0.5996 
(0.4900) 
0.3730 
(0.4834) 
     
Number of Observations 31,942 5,387 19,390 7,165 
     
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Child-Support Receipt equals one if the single mother receives child 
support.  
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Table 3: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics For Single-Mother and State-Level Controls  
Variable Name Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
    Single Mother Controls: 
    Divorced =1 if single mother is divorced 0.5023 0.4999 
Separated =1 if single mother is separated 0.2392 0.4266 
Never Married =1 if single mother is never married 0.2584 0.4378 
Receives Public Assistance =1 if single mother receives public assistance 0.3799 0.4854 
Children under 6 Number of children in household under 6 years of age  0.5573 0.7697 
Children under 18 Number of children in household under 18 years of age 1.8638 1.0276 
Age In years 33.430 7.3872 
Age squared Age in years squared 1172.1 503.65 
Black =1 if single mother is black 0.2656 0.4416 
Hispanic =1 if single mother is Hispanic  0.1589 0.3656 
High School =1 if single mother has only a high-school degree 0.4057 0.4910 
Some College =1 if single mother has attended college with no degree 0.1957 0.3967 
Graduate =1 if single mother is a college graduate 0.0848 0.2785 
Metro =1 if single mother lives in an urban area 0.7203 0.4489 
    
State-Level Controls:    
    AFDC Benefit Dollar amount of the maximum AFDC benefit paid to families of four 365.66 146.17 
Unemployment Percentage of the unemployed population who is searching for employment 7.0280 2.0592 
CSE Expenditures Dollar amount spent on child-support enforcement per single-mother family  61.799 32.190 
Genetic Testing  =1 if state allows genetic testing to be used in establishing paternity 0.5794 0.4937 
Wage Withholding =1 if state withholds wages from the paychecks of delinquent parents 0.7906 0.4069 
Immediate Withholding  =1 if state withholds payments for all new cases of mothers on welfare 0.3674 0.4821 
Universal Withholding  =1 if state withholds payments from parents regardless of welfare receipt 0.1769 0.3896 
Paternity Until 18 Years =1 if state allows the establishment of paternity until child reaches age 18 0.6535 0.4759 
Numerical Guidelines =1 if state has guidelines in place for issuing child-support orders 0.4524 0.4977 
Presumptive Guidelines =1 if state mandates judges to follow the numerical guidelines 0.3683 0.4823 
State Intercept   =1 if state intercepts income-tax refunds for child-support orders in arrears 0.4904 0.4999 
    
Notes: Means and standard deviations are for the full sample, with 51,274 observations for all variables (all single mothers).  The variables AFDC Benefit and 
CSE Expenditures are measured in 1993 dollars.   
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Table 4: Logit Estimates for the Effects of Joint-Custody Laws on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers  
Variable All  Never Married Divorced  Separated 
     
Joint-Custody Reform 
 0.0212** -0.0007  0.0363***  0.0171 
(0.0090) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0164) 
Divorced 
 0.2548*** 
     --      --     -- 
(0.0070) 
Separated 
 0.1120*** 
     --      --     -- 
(0.0084) 
Receives Public Assistance 
-0.1819*** -0.0151** -0.2880*** -0.1496*** 
(0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0085) (0.0097) 
     
Number of Observations 51,274 13,251 25,756 12,267 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 
3. We adjust our standard errors by clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table 5: Logit Estimates for the Effects of Joint-Custody Laws on the Child-Support Receipt of 
Single Mothers Who Receive Public Assistance 
Variable All  Never Married Divorced  Separated 
     
Joint-Custody Reform 
-0.0035 -0.0190  0.0198 -0.0100 
(0.0112) (0.0162) (0.0200) (0.0217) 
Divorced 
 0.1150*** 
     --     --      -- 
(0.0086) 
Separated 
 0.0461*** 
     --     --      -- 
(0.0082) 
     
Number of Observations 19,322 7,864 6,366 5,102 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 
3.  We adjust our standard errors by clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table 6: Logit Estimates for the Effects of Joint-Custody Laws on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers Who Do Not Receive Public Assistance 
Variable All  Never Married   Divorced  Separated 
     
Joint-Custody Reform 
 0.0337***  0.0260  0.0344**  0.0320 
(0.0116) (0.0173) (0.0134) (0.0238) 
Divorced 
 0.1900*** 
     --      --      -- 
(0.0075) 
Separated 
 0.1802*** 
     --      --      -- 
(0.0112) 
     
Number of Observations 31,942 5,387 19,390 7,165 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 
3.  We adjust our standard errors by clustering at the state-time level.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Logit Estimates for the Effects of Single-Mother Controls on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers 
Variable  All Never 
Married 
Divorced Separated 
     
Children under 6 
-0.0183*** -0.0030 -0.0264*** -0.0105 
(0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0071) (0.0066) 
Children under 18 
 0.0306***  0.0067*  0.0433***  0.0176*** 
(0.0027) (0.0037) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Metro 
-0.0095 -0.0320*** -0.0073  0.0060 
(0.0062) (0.0094) (0.0086) (0.0111) 
Age 
 0.0046  0.0076**  0.0035  0.0163** 
(0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0064) 
Age-squared 
-0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0002*** 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Black 
-0.1835*** -0.0392*** -0.2912*** -0.1529*** 
(0.0061) (0.0077) (0.0097) (0.0090) 
Hispanic 
-0.1240*** -0.0434*** -0.1515*** -0.1116*** 
(0.0075) (0.0092) (0.0141) (0.0113) 
High School Graduate 
 0.1224***  0.0518***  0.1527***  0.0884*** 
(0.0067) (0.0080) (0.0101) (0.0111) 
Some College 
 0.2027***  0.1211***  0.2156***  0.1814*** 
(0.0083) (0.0147) (0.0104) (0.0159) 
College Graduate 
 0.2522***  0.1026***  0.2641***  0.2134*** 
(0.0110) (0.0223) (0.0117) (0.0234) 
     
Number of Observations 51,274 13,251 25,756 12,267 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 
3. We adjust our standard errors by clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table A2: Logit Estimates for the Effects of State-Level Controls on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers 
Variable  All Never Married Divorced Separated 
     
AFDC Benefit 
 0.0001 -0.0001  0.0001  0.0004** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
AFDC Benefit (-1) 
-0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 -0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unemployment 
-0.0029 -0.0148  0.0085 -0.0215 
(0.0082) (0.0134) (0.0113) (0.0166) 
Unemployment (-1) 
 0.0134  0.0185 -0.0018  0.0470** 
(0.0110) (0.0153) (0.0162) (0.0218) 
Unemployment (-2)  
-0.0089 -0.0010 -0.0072 -0.0193 
(0.0070) (0.0066) (0.0107) (0.0142) 
Child-Support Expenditures  
-0.0001 -0.0002  0.0000  0.0000 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Genetic Testing (-1) 
-0.0148 -0.0151 -0.0130 -0.0119 
(0.0091) (0.0115) (0.0124) (0.0153) 
Wage Withholding 
 0.0082  0.0129  0.0089  0.0064 
(0.0092) (0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0160) 
Immediate Withholding 
-0.0107  0.0057 -0.0130 -0.0179 
(0.0120) (0.0141) (0.0158) (0.0186) 
Universal Withholding 
 0.0275**  0.0200  0.0365** -0.0032 
(0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0153) (0.0170) 
Paternity Until 18 Years 
-0.0091  0.0010 -0.0285**  0.0242 
(0.0101) (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0159) 
Numerical Guidelines 
-0.0105 -0.0011 -0.0121 -0.0122 
(0.0117) (0.0135) (0.0166) (0.0173) 
Presumptive Guidelines 
 0.0154  0.0092  0.0083  0.0202 
(0.0183) (0.0201) (0.0206) (0.0278) 
State Intercept (-1) 
-0.0017 -0.0111  0.0189 -0.0290* 
(0.0089) (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0156) 
     
Number of Observations 51,274 13,251 25,756 12,267 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects.  (-1) denotes a lag order of one and (-2) denotes a lag of order two. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.  Each 
specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 3. We adjust our standard errors by 
clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table A3: Logit Estimates for the Effects of Single-Mother Controls on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers Who Receive Public Assistance 
Variable  All Never 
Married 
Divorced Separated 
     
Children under 6 
-0.0032 -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0055 
(0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0095) (0.0068) 
Children under 18 
 0.0020  0.0026 -0.0023  0.0046 
(0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0046) 
Metro 
-0.0177** -0.0130 -0.0292** -0.0117 
(0.0079) (0.0111) (0.0146) (0.0147) 
Age 
 0.0026  0.0090** -0.0064  0.0036 
(0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0081) (0.0071) 
Age-squared 
-0.0001 -0.0002**  0.0001 -0.0001 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Black 
-0.0622*** -0.0474*** -0.0883*** -0.0656*** 
(0.0067) (0.0093) (0.0144) (0.0109) 
Hispanic 
-0.0535*** -0.0468*** -0.0769*** -0.0448*** 
(0.0079) (0.0096) (0.0186) (0.0140) 
High School Graduate 
 0.0667***  0.0424***  0.1044***  0.0599*** 
(0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0141) (0.0139) 
Some College 
 0.1891***  0.1453***  0.2505***  0.1726*** 
(0.0141) (0.0208) (0.0229) (0.0247) 
College Graduate 
 0.2552***  0.1232**  0.3551***  0.2085*** 
(0.0313) (0.0511) (0.0448) (0.0614) 
     
Number of Observations 19,322 7,864 6,366 5,102 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 
3. We adjust our standard errors by clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table A4: Logit Estimates for the Effects of State-Level Controls on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers Who Receive Public Assistance 
Variable  All Never Married Divorced Separated 
     
AFDC Benefit 
 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001  0.0004** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
AFDC Benefit (-1) 
 0.0000  0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002* 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unemployment 
-0.0056 -0.0102  0.0030 -0.0025 
(0.0107) (0.0148) (0.0181) (0.0205) 
Unemployment (-1) 
 0.0181  0.0116  0.0245  0.0182 
(0.0117) (0.0163) (0.0221) (0.0244) 
Unemployment (-2)  
-0.0096 -0.0011 -0.0187 -0.0145 
(0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0161) (0.0135) 
Child-Support Expenditures  
 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0003  0.0008** 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) 
Genetic Testing (-1) 
-0.0158 -0.0055 -0.0348 -0.0105 
(0.0111) (0.0132) (0.0213) (0.0189) 
Wage Withholding 
-0.0132 -0.0043 -0.0080 -0.0265 
(0.0116) (0.0149) (0.0213) (0.0221) 
Immediate Withholding 
-0.0166  0.0116 -0.0403 -0.0332 
(0.0140) (0.0186) (0.0265) (0.0215) 
Universal Withholding 
 0.0329**  0.0105  0.0924***  0.0067 
(0.0141) (0.0156) (0.0296) (0.0227) 
Paternity Until 18 Years 
 0.0083  0.0002 -0.0063  0.0367* 
(0.0130) (0.0159) (0.0243) (0.0202) 
Numerical Guidelines 
-0.0135 -0.0032 -0.0067 -0.0377* 
(0.0141) (0.0160) (0.0256) (0.0212) 
Presumptive Guidelines 
 0.0125 -0.0065  0.0061  0.0594 
(0.0193) (0.0243) (0.0314) (0.0388) 
State Intercept (-1) 
-0.0147 -0.0178  0.0009 -0.0427** 
(0.0107) (0.0140) (0.0213) (0.0194) 
     
Number of Observations 19,322 7,864 6,366 5,102 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects.  (-1) denotes a lag order of one and (-2) denotes a lag of order two. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.  Each 
specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 3. We adjust our standard errors by 
clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table A5: Logit Estimates for the Effects of Single-Mother Controls on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers Who Do Not Receive Public Assistance 
Variable  All Never Married Divorced Separated 
     
Children under 6 
-0.0264*** -0.0018 -0.0306*** -0.0145 
(0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0108) 
Children under 18 
 0.0528***  0.0168**  0.0620***  0.0310*** 
(0.0041) (0.0066) (0.0052) (0.0070) 
Metro 
-0.0025 -0.0498***  0.0002  0.0273* 
(0.0083) (0.0150) (0.0096) (0.0163) 
Age 
 0.0124***  0.0082  0.0066  0.0292*** 
(0.0046) (0.0066) (0.0059) (0.0090) 
Age-squared 
-0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0001* -0.0004*** 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Black 
-0.2601*** -0.0324** -0.3500*** -0.2185*** 
(0.0083) (0.0134) (0.0113) (0.0136) 
Hispanic 
-0.1556*** -0.0334* -0.1621*** -0.1495*** 
(0.0110) (0.0181) (0.0158) (0.0167) 
High School Graduate 
 0.1366***  0.0539***  0.1480***  0.0974*** 
(0.0094) (0.0143) (0.0116) (0.0171) 
Some College 
 0.1937***  0.1022***  0.1873***  0.1805*** 
(0.0096) (0.0198) (0.0109) (0.0200) 
College Graduate 
 0.2425***  0.1028***  0.2330***  0.2148*** 
(0.0111) (0.0282) (0.0110) (0.0250) 
     
Number of Observations 31,942 5,387 19,390 7,165 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and 
one percent levels, respectively.  Each specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 
3. We adjust our standard errors by clustering at the state-time level.  
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Table A6: Logit Estimates for the Effects of State-Level Controls on the Child-Support 
Receipt of Single Mothers Who Do Not Receive Public Assistance 
Variable  All Never Married Divorced Separated 
     
AFDC Benefit 
 0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0003 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
AFDC Benefit (-1) 
 0.0000 -0.0001  0.0001  0.0000 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Unemployment 
-0.0014 -0.0233  0.0082 -0.0353 
(0.0107) (0.0238) (0.0124) (0.0237) 
Unemployment (-1) 
 0.0078  0.0313 -0.0098  0.0596* 
(0.0152) (0.0267) (0.0183) (0.0328) 
Unemployment (-2)  
-0.0038  0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0136 
(0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0125) (0.0227) 
Child-Support Expenditures  
-0.0003 -0.0001  0.0000 -0.0008** 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Genetic Testing (-1) 
-0.0031 -0.0206  0.0041 -0.0057 
(0.0110) (0.0185) (0.0125) (0.0225) 
Wage Withholding 
 0.0219*  0.0347**  0.0117  0.0337 
(0.0118) (0.0175) (0.0139) (0.0218) 
Immediate Withholding 
 0.0003  0.0022  0.0034 -0.0021 
(0.0133) (0.0209) (0.0160) (0.0258) 
Universal Withholding 
 0.0169  0.0347*  0.0138 -0.0138 
(0.0133) (0.0206) (0.0155) (0.0236) 
Paternity Until 18 Years 
-0.0233* -0.0005 -0.0353***  0.0108 
(0.0122) (0.0199) (0.0135) (0.0243) 
Numerical Guidelines 
-0.0054  0.0041 -0.0127  0.0136 
(0.0132) (0.0214) (0.0163) (0.0262) 
Presumptive Guidelines 
 0.0109  0.0265  0.0043 -0.0133 
(0.0203) (0.0274) (0.0220) (0.0351) 
State Intercept (-1) 
0.0035 -0.0115  0.0204 -0.0269 
(0.0113) (0.0190) (0.0131) (0.0226) 
     
Number of Observations 31,942 5,387 19,390 7,165 
     
Notes: Estimates are reported as marginal effects.  (-1) denotes a lag order of one and (-2) denotes a lag of order two. 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five, and one percent levels, respectively.  Each 
specification includes state and year fixed effects and the controls from Table 3. We adjust our standard errors by 
clustering at the state-time level.  
 
 
